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STRICT INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES OF
VIRGINIA
Penal statutes strictly and properly speaking are those imposing
punishment for an offense against the State, which under the Con-
stitution, the executive of the State would have the power to pardon.
In common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to include
under the term penal statutes all statutes which compel or prohibit
certain acts and establish penalties for their violation, and even those
which without expressly prohibiting acts, impose a penalty upon their
commission.
Under *this broader definition penal statutes include not only
those in which a penalty is recovered by a public prosecution and
inures to the State, but also those permitting a recovery of the pen-
alty by a private individual in an action of debt or Qui Tam, the
latter of which being the type of action which imposes a penalty for
doing or not doing an act, and gives the penalty in part to whomso-
ever will sue for the 'sameand the other part to the Commonwealth
or some charitable institution and makes it recoverable by action.!
In Virginia this field of penal statutes has been rather broad. As
early as 1810, a statute which authorized the sale of land for taxes
was held to be penal by the courts.2
It is very important in applying the strict interpretation rule
to penal statutes to distinguish them from statutes purely remedial.
The true test in determining whether a statute is penal is whether
the penalty is imposed for the punishment of a wrong to the public,
or for the redress of an injury to the individual. If the statute
permits a recovery of the penalty by an individual for the purpose of
enforcing obedience to the mandate of the law by punishing its vio-
lation, it is penal in character. If, however, the recovery of the
penalty by an individual is permitted as a remedy for the injury or
loss suffered by him, the statute is remedial. It is the substance and
effect rather than the form which is to be looked to in determining
whether a statute is penal or remedial. The word penal interpreted
thusly as can be seen by the foregoing has a much broader connota-
tion than the word criminal.3
'Penal statutes are construed with the aid of all the ordinary
rules for the construction of statutes. The courts do so in the light
of the evil to be remedied and with the cardinal objective of ascer-
taining and giving effect to the intention of the legislature, as the
intention of the legislature, where it can be discovered must con-
trol.4
The construction of these penal statutes in Virginia follows the
.fundamental rule of strict interpretation. Strict or literal interpre-
tation is the term applied where the intention is collected only from
the words used.s While the courts cling doggedly to this concept
of strict interpretation, they point out that they will not carry it to
the point of defeating the clear intent of the legislature or to reach
any unreasonably absurd results by too strict adherance to it. It is
only to resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the defendant.6
In the review of a conviction on a charge of seduction of a wo-
man who had been divorced, the court refused to interpret beyond
the fair meaning of the words used in the statute and held that the
words "unmarried female of previous chaste character," must be con-
strued strictly, this being a highly penal statute. By that construc-
tion no intention on the part of the legislature could be ascertained
to include divorced women within the category.7
In a conviction of a charge of disorderly conduct on a bus the
court pointed out that disorderly conduct was not a common law
crime and that the statute under which the defendant had been
convicted provided penalties for "being disorderly on any car or
caboose or any other part of a train or street railway." Therefore,
a strict interpretation of the statute would not include disorderly con-
duct on a bus.S
In 1924, a series of cases was brought by the town of South Bos-
ton, in which the town sought to exercise jurisdiction granted to
cities by the Prohibition Act.9 The court held that in order to en-
force a penalty against a person, his act must be brought within the
letter of the statute even though it be within the teeth of the spirit
and policy of the law.
The court in two previous cases had pointed up the necessity
of being both within the letter and the spirit of the law.xo In one
of these, the Sutherland case, a man was carrying in his hand two
saddle bags with lids closed, one of which contained a holstered pis-
tol. He was convicted of illegally "carrying about his person hid-
den from common observation apy pistol." The court held, inter-
preting the statute strictly, that this failed to come within the letter
and the spirit of the law and the conviction was reversed.
In more recent cases the court has refused to extend statutes
by implication. In Boyles v City of Roanoke,"r the appellant was
convicted of violating a city ordinance which was at variance with the
city's charter. The charter granted power to provide penalties for
violation of ordinances by "imprisonment not exceeding six months."
The ordinance in question provided the accused could not be im-
prisoned under it for more than twelve months. Accused maintained
this ordinance was void as result of this inconsistency. The court
held the words of the ordinance would not be extended by implica-
tion so as to save it; the strict interpretation 'would be adhered to
and the conviction reversed.
In a case involving the introduction of evidence of previous
violations of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, as specifically pro-
vided by the act, the court held that interpreting the act strictly this
evidence must be restricted so as to bear only on the quantum of
punishment and could not be used as substantive evidence of the
guilt of the accused.1z
In a more recent case involving the conviction of a man accused
of shooting dogs under a statute which permitted such prosecution
if dogs were listed and assessed, the dogs in question were licensed
but they were not shown to be listed and assessed in the office of
the Commissioner of Revenue. The court held that it was not with-
in their province to rewrite statutes. If the case failed to come
within the letter and the spirit, no implication could bring it in.'3
There is a tendency by the Supreme Court of Appeals to resolve
all ambiguities on the face of an act in favor of the defendant.x4
This rigorous application of the strict interpretation requirement
serves to impress upon the legislature the necessity of careful and
concise draftmanship.
It has been pointed out that this rule of strict construction of
penal statutes is a fundamental rule generally followed by all courts
except in jurisdictions where it has been specifically abrogated by
statute. In nearly one-half the jurisdictions where these statutes
have been enacted we find the courts giving effect to the strict con-
struction, rule in.spite of their existence.i5 Also, it has been shown
by cases over a long period of time, a period which included some
extreme upheavals politically, economically, and socially, how well
this rule has been carried through by the Virginia courts.
One of the reasons for the inclusion of this rule in our system of
law was the attempt to establish a definite rule limiting the discre-
tion of the judge so that the individual could safely act under and
understand the law to which he was required to conform. Another
reason is found in the ever present concern of the law for the rights
of individuals, and on the principle that the power of punishment is
vested in the legislature and not in the judiciary.z6 This concept,
which is probably the most important reason for the strict con-
struction rule, is based on the bed-rock of our form of government
in the Constitution. This is the operative manifestation of the
separation of powers principle; this is the cleavage which was thought
so necessary by the framers of the Constitution. It is rather gratify-
ing to see this strict construction rule clung to so tenaciously by the
courts in guaranteeing the right of the individual under law and
preserving this fundamental division between the legislature and
the judiciary.
EDGAR K. WELLS, Jr.
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